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as was expedient. The opinion implied that the plaintiffs were ungrateful in attempting to shorten the period of RFC control since they "... . having been
saved from drowning, were not content to merely ride in the boat which had
been so successully navigated by RFC but decided to take over and row it for
themselves."5 This attitude is in sharp contrast, not only with the duty which a
private creditor in control of a corporation should owe to the stockowners, but
with the criticisms of a recent Senate committee which urged that the RFC
6
withdraw from reorganization proceedings as soon as possible.
Soon after the decision in this case a settlement was reached whereby the entire $3o,ooo,ooo indebtedness of Maryland to the RFC was discharged through
a sale of preferred stock to the public.7 The plaintiff's committee had already
announced its intention to appeal the decision. In the light of recent extensions
of corporate fiduciary obligations, 8 it is possible that the Supreme Court would
have imposed upon creditors, including government agencies, in control of corporate affairs a higher standard of fairness. The Supreme Court has said that a
"dominant or controlling stockholder or group of stockholders" is a fiduciary,
and "where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director or stockholder not only to prove the good
faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint
of the corporation and those interested therein ..... The essence of the test is
whether or not under the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of
an arm's-length bargain."'9
The transaction in the instant case might well be considered as not within
the usual conception of "an arm's-length bargain."
Federal Courts-Relation to State Courts and Law-Effect of State Rules
of Forum Non Conveniens under Erie v. Tompkins-[Federal].-The plaintiff,
a Virginia corporation, brought an action in a federal district court in New
York for damages arising from a tort allegedly committed in Virginia by a
Pennsylvania corporation. The action was dismissed by the district court'on
the ground o fqon non conveniens.' n appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals
for tieecond Circut, hield, on the basis of the federal precedents, the doctrine
of forum non conveniens cannot be invoked merely because a tort cause of action against a foreign corporation arises in another jurisdiction; and the defend'S Todd v. Maryland Casualty Co., i55 F. 2d 29, 38 (C.C.A. 7th, 1946).

,6S. Rep. 925, 79 th Cong. 2d Sess. 33 (1946).
7Moody's Investors Service, Banks & Finance 1749, 1795 (Aug. 7, July 17, 1946).
'sYoung v. Higbee, 324 U.S. 204 (i945); Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois,
312 U.S. 5Io (1941); Pepper v. Litton, 3o8 U.S. 295 (1939); Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric
Co., 3o6 U.S. 307 (1939).

Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 3o6-7 (1939).
XPllbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F. Supp. 291 (N.Y., 1945).
'9

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

ant made no sufficient showing of vexation or oppression in the plaintiff's
choice of the forum for the suit to warrant dismissal. Judgment reversed, one
judge dissenting. Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp.2
Including the instant case, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has had before it in the past two years four cases involving the problem
of the applicability of forum non conveniens,3 each of which at least by implication presented the question of whether state law should control this issue under
the rule in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.4 In the earliest of these, Weiss v. Routh, the
court upon its own motion raised the question and unanimously decided that
the state rule as to forum non conveniens must control. Although this case has
not been expressly overruled, in the subsequent cases the same court has decided the question of forum non conveniens independently of the state precedents. This result has been reached either on the assumption that state and federal law were the same, 6 or on the ground that the problem might more aptly be
characterized as one of "procedure,"7 or on the ground that the question was one
of the jurisdiction of federal courts.' One of these cases, Williams v. Green Bay
& Western R. Co.,9 has been before the Supreme Court for review, but in that
case the Court specifically reserved the question of the applicability of the Erie
doctrine. Since there are significant differences in approach in both state and
federal courts to the question of forum non conveniens in generalz' and since it
153 F. 2d 883 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1946), cert. granted 66 S.Ct. 1123 (1946).
2

3 Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 153 F. 2d 883 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1946); Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 153 F. 2d 888 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1946), cert. granted 67 S. Ct. 6i (1946);
Williams v. Green Bay & Western R. Co., 147 F. 2d 777 (C.C.A. 2nd, i945), rev'd 326 U.S.
549 (x946); Weiss v. Routh, 149 F. 2d 193 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1945).
4304 U.S.

64 (1938).
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F. 2d 193 (C.C.A. 2nd, i945).
6 Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 153 F. 2d 883 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1946); Williams v. Green Bay &
Western R. Co., i47 F. 2d 777 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1945), rev'd on other grounds 326 U.S. 549
(1946); cf. Overfield v. Pennroad Corp., 113 F. 2nd 6 (C.C.A. 3 rd, i94o).
7Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., i53 F. 2d 883, 885 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1946).
8Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 153 F. 2d 888 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1946).
9326 U.S. 549 (1946).
10 The doctrine may be briefly outlined in the terms of the three considerations which have
generally caused it to be invoked in both state and federal courts: (a) vexation and oppression
to the defendant, Canada Malting Co., Ltd. v. Paterson Steamship, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932);
Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, Ltd., 28x Mass. 303, 184 N.E. 152 (i033);
Thurman v. Chicago M. &St. P. Ry., 254 Mass. 569, 51 N.E. 63 (1926); (b) inconvenience and
expense to the dismissing court, State ex rel. Goldwyn Distributing Corp. v. Gehrz, i8x Wis. 238,
19 4 N.W. 418 (1923); Collard v. Beach, 93 App. Div. 339,87 N.Y. Supp. 884 (19o4); (c) desirability of having the internal affairs of a corporation adjudicated in the forum of its incorporation,
Williams v. Green Bay & Western R. Co., 326 U.S. 549 (1946); Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co.
of New York, 288 U.S. 123 (i933); Wojtczak v. American United Life Ins. Co., 293 Mich. 449,
292 N.W. 364 (194o). See Rest., Conflict of Laws §§ 192-202 (1934); The Development of the
"Internal Affairs" Rule in the Federal Courts, and Its Future under Erie v. Tompkins, 46
Col. L. Rev. 413 (1Q46). For comprehensive treatments of the subject of forum non conveniens,
see Gibbs, International Law of Jurisdiction (X926); Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Con-
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seems that distinct federal rules on the subject are being developed, it is evident
that a dearer and more consistent statement of the status of state doctrines of
forum non conveniens in the federal courts is needed.
The instant case, as the only tort action of the four cases previously alluded
to," possibly brings into sharper focus the cleavage between state and federal
doctrines of forum non conveniens and the need for deciding whether the Erie
principle has any force in this area. Some state courts have developed a policy
of refusing jurisdiction of foreign tort actions wherein neither party is a resident of the state of the forum.12 It is significant that New York, the state of forum in the instant case, has long been a leader in the development of this policy;3 yet the possibility of difference between state and federal rules was ignored in the assumption by the circuit court that the doctrine of forum non
conveniens as applied by state and federal courts was indistinguishable.4 A
further instance of the difference of approach in state and federal courts may
arise from the recent modification of the Supreme Court's position as to the
jurisdiction of federal courts over the internal affairs of a foreign corporation.
The general rule announced in Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York' s that
a federal court would not accept jurisdiction of a suit involving the internal
affairs of a foreign corporation, although much criticized 6 and often given bare
lip-service by lower courts,' 7 probably represented the position of the state
veniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 Col. L. Rev. 1 (1929); Dainow, The Inappropriate Forum,
29 Ill. L. Rev. 867 (I935); Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Action, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1217, 44
Harv. L. Rev. 41 (i93o); 32 A.L.R. 6 (1924).
zxNote 3 supra.
State ex rel. Goldwyn Distributing Corp. v. Gehrz, 18i Wis. 238, 194 N.W. 418 (1923);
Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 127 Wis. 65I, io6 N.W. 821 (19o6), aff'd 208 U.S. 570
(i9o8); Mexican Nat'l R. Co. v. Jackson, 89 Tex. 107,33 S.W. 857 (1896); Cofrode v. Gartner,
79 Mich. 332, 44 N.W. 623 (i8go). See Blair, op. cit. supra note io, at 25-27, 34; 32 A.L.R. 6
(1924).
13 Pietraroia v. New Jersey & Hudson R. & F. Co., 197 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E. 120 (1910);
Hoes v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 173 N.Y. 435, 66 N.E. iig (i9o3); Collard v. Beach,
93 App. Div. 339, 87 N.Y. Supp. 884 (I9O4). Although New York courts are granted jurisdiction over foreign tort actions involving foreign corporations doing business in the state,
N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law. (McKinney, 1943) c. 23, §§ 223-25, this provision has been interpreted
as being permissive only, and jurisdiction has often been declined. Gregonis v. Philadelphia
& Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235 N.Y. 152, i39 N.E. 223 (1923); cf. Douglas v. New York,
N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929); Murnam v. Wabash R. Co., 246 N.Y. 244, I58 N.E.
5o8 (1927). See Blair, op. cit. supra note io, at 34.
'4

Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 153 F. 2d 883, 884, 885 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1946).

288 U.S. 123 (1933).
The Development of the "Internal Affairs" Rule in the Federal Courts, and Its Future
under Erie v. Tompkins, 46 Col. L. Rev. 413 (r946); Jurisdiction of a Court to Interfere with
the Internal Affairs of a Foreign Corporation, i8 Minn. L. Rev. 192 (i934); Interference with
the Internal Affairs of a Foreign Corporation, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 682 (1933).
'5

16

'7 Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 F. 2d 3 3 2 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1933); Balch v. Investors
Royalty Co., 7 F. Supp. 420 (Okla., 1934); National Lock Co. v. Hogland, 1 F. 2d 576
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courts fairly closely. The recent restriction of the Rogers case in Williains v.
Green Bay & Western R. Co. has perhaps widened the differences between state
and federal rules 8 and thus made more acute the question of the applicability
of the Erie doctrine.
At least two approaches might be followed in considering whether the Erie
doctrine should be extended to matters of forum non conveniens. In the case of
Weiss v. Routh,19 the position was taken by the court that the conformity of results with state courts required by the Erie doctrine necessitated the application of the state rule of forum non conveniens. This is in effect the same method
of solution found in the numerous cases under the Erie doctrine in which the
2
issue is stated in terms of whether the matter is substantive or procedural. It
involves the assumption that the matter is one of sufficient significance that
state law must control and that no other considerations apply; yet in similar
cases the same distinction has been used to produce a precisely contrary result." The substance-procedure distinction in the conflict of laws has long been
recognized as being far from automatic in its application, and often the mere
statement of a conclusion,- and the recent case of Guaranty Trust Co. of New
York v. York23 indicates that the line of demarcation between substance and
procedure is even more indefinite under the Erie doctrine. It is submitted that a
more fundamental approach to the problem of forum non conveniens in federal
0

(C.C.A. 7th, i938). The courts to avoid the Rogers rule have distinguished it away by finding
the affairs to be not truly "internal" or by finding the defendant guilty of fraud or breach of
trust. The Development of the "Internal Affairs" Rule in the Federal Courts, and Its Future
under Erie v. Tompkins, 46 Col. L. Rev. 413,

421

(1946).

18 The

Williams case restricts a federal court's discretion to. dismiss to those situations
where the remedies and supervision of the courts of the corporation's domicile are required or
are more appropriate, or where substantial oppression to the defendant exists. In contrast, in
a number of cases state courts have refused jurisdiction with far less restriction limiting their
discretion. Langfelder v. Universal Laboratories, 293 N.Y. 200, 56 N.E. 2d 550 (I944);
Farmers' Educational and Cooperative Union of America, Minnesota Division v. Farmers'
Educational and Cooperative Union of America, 207 Minn. 80, 283 N.W. 884 (i94o); Wojtczak
v. American United Life Ins. Co., 293 Mich. 449, 292 N.W. 364 (194o); Arizona Commercial
Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co., 236 Mass. 185, 128 N.E. 4 (1920).
19 149 F. 2d 193 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1945).
20 Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. io9 (1943); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941);

Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 2o8 (1939); Sampson v. Channell, xio F.

2d

754

(C.C.A. 1st, I94O).
2" Note 7 supra; cf Angel v. Bullington, i5o F. 2d 679 (C.C.A. th, 1945), cert. granted
4
66 S. Ct. 231 (i945), reargument ordered 66 S. Ct. 1358 (1946), noted in 13 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. I95 (1946).

- Davis v. Mills, 194U.S. 451 (x9o4); Fitzpatrick v. Internat'l R. Co., 252 N.Y. 127, 199

N.E. 112 (1929). See Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 Yale
LJ. 333 (1933); Ails, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 39 Mich. L. Rev.
392 (1941); 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 723 (1941), noting Maki v. George R. Cooke Co., 124 F. 2d
663 (C.C.A. 6th, 1942).
'3326 U.S. 99 (ig4s); cf. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (194); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 3o8 U.S. 2o8 (1939).
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courts is found in Koster v. Lumbermens Mutsal Casualty Co.,24 decided on the
same day as the instant case, in which the question was discussed as involving
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. While forum non conveniens does not involve the question of jurisdiction in the strictest sense, it nevertheless involves
the question, preliminary to any suit, of whether or not jurisdiction shall be
exercised and a decision on the merits undertaken. 25 Although the courts of a
given state may feel that they are too busy to undertake to hear certain foreign
causes of action,'26 a federal court must consider that there will be no net saving
in the work of the federal courts as a whole by refusing jurisdiction.
A refusal of jurisdiction under forum non conveniens involves no decision on
the merits, and the substantial rights of the parties remain unaffected; thus the
need for conformity with state courts is by no means as obvious as it is in the
usual Erie problem, even if the state court would have heard the case in the
particular instance. State laws can not restrict the jurisdiction of the federal
courts,

7

and recent cases have indicated that federal judges must be very care-

ful in relinquishing that jurisdiction.21 If it is recognized that forum non conveniens is essentially a jurisdictional question9 and that it lies in the discretion
of each system of courts to determine how far it shall extend, it remains for the
federal courts to work out their own rules upon considerations of oppression and
vexation to defendants, availability of more appropriate remedies elsewhere,
and the national character of the federal courts. The fact that in the majority
of recent cases the federal courts have managed, by one route or another, to decide the forum non conveniens question under federal precedents30 is indicative
24153 F. 2d 888 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1946).
25 "The doctrine ....
involves nothing more than an appeal to the inherent powers possessed by every court of justice-powers, that is to say, which are incontestably necessary to
the effective performance of judicial functions." Blair, op. cit. supra note io, at i; see also
Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929)..
26 Notes io and 12 supra.

27 Stephenson v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., iio F. 2d 4oi (C.C.A. 7th, 194o); Martineau
v. Eastern Air Lines, 64 F. Supp. 235 (Ill., 1946);cf. Miles v.Illinois Central R.Co.,315 U.S. 698
(1942); Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941); Developments in the Doctrine
of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins I, 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. io9, 116-17 (i94i). See also the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York,
326 U.S. 99, X12 (1945).
28 Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490 (1946); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (i943).
But cf. A.F. of L. v. Watson, 66 S. Ct. 761 (1946); Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U.S. 168
(1942); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Thompson v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (i94o).
29 Note 25 supra.

30 Williams v. Green Bay & Western R. Co., 326 U.S. 549 (1946); Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
153 F. 2d 883 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1946); Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 153 F. 2d 888
(C.C.A. 2nd, 1946); Kelley v. American Sugar Refining Co., 139 F. 2d 76 (C.C.A. ist, 1943),
cert. den. 321 U.S. 791; Overfield v. Pennroad Corp., 113 F. 2d 6 (C.C.A. 3rd, i94o); Grismer
v. Merger Mines Corp., 43 F. Supp. 99 o (Wash., 1942), aff'd sub nom. Merger Mines Corp.
v. Grismer, 137 F. 2d 335 (C.C.A. 9th, 1943); Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 54 F.
Supp. s88 (Pa., 1944); Healey v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 48 F. Supp. 207 (N.C., 1942).
Contra: Weiss v. Routh, 149 F. 2d 193 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1945).
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that the doctrine involves considerations which the federal courts must decide
for themselves and, further, that the Erie doctrine does not foreclose all possibility of independence on the part of federal courts. 3' It might even be suggested
that, since federal courts must now follow the conflict of laws rules of the state
in which they sit32 and since this at times leads to undesirable results,33 especially where nation-wide service of process is available under the Interpleader
Act,34 the federal courts might use an independently developed forum non conveniens doctrine to relegate suits to a forum where a more appropriate law is
available. It must be recognized, however, that this would be contrary to the
present tendency to apply forum non conveniens less restrictively in the federal
courts.

35

Insurance-Cooperation Clause--Conflict of Interest between Insured and
Insurer as Excuse from Compliance-[California].-Following an intersection
collision between the automobiles of both insured parties, each of whom carried
identical policies of liability insurance with the same insurers,' a negligence complaint was filed to which a cross-complaint was filed. The personal attorneys for
the cross-complainant notified the insurer that they would also conduct the defense in the action. The insurer advised the defendant and cross-complainant
in the negligence action that it was relieved of any liability under the policy because the defendant had violated the cooperation clause of the policy by not
permitting the insurer to conduct the defense in the negligence action.2 The
plaintiff in the present suit (defendant and cross-complainant in the negligence
action) instituted this declaratory judgment proceeding, naming the plaintiff in
the negligence action and the insurer as defendants, to determine the rights of
the parties under the policies. The trial court held that since the plaintiff in the
instant case had violated the cooperation clause, the insurer was relieved of li31 Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts; The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins,
55 Yale L. J. 267 (1945); Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins: The Survival of Federal Common

Law, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 966 (1946).

32Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 487 (I941); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
33 Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (I941), noted in 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. i4I (1941).

Stat. io96 (1936) as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (26) (Supp., 1945).
Compare Williams v. Green Bay &Western R. Co., 326 U.S. 549 (x946), with Rogers v.
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 288 U.S. 123 (1933); see note x8 supra.
xUnder complementary policies both were insured by Firemen's Insurance Company and
the Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company. The two companies are referred to hereafter as the insurer.
2The policy provided that the insurer "shaH defend in his name and behalf any suit against
the insured .... ; but the Company shall have the right to make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit as may be deemed expedient by the Company.
.... [The insured] shall cooperate with the Company and, upon the Company's request,
shall attend hearings and trials and shall assist in effecting settlements, securing and giving
evidence, obtaining the attendance of witnesses, and in the conduct of suit. The insured
shall not, except at his own cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any obligation or
incur any expense other than for such immediate medical or surgical relief to others as shall
be imperative at the time of the accident." O'Morrow v. Borad, 167 P. 2d 483,485 (Cal., 1946).
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